This study investigates elite-mass partisan congruence in African dominant party systems. I argue that dominant party systems with stable opposition parties provide more capacity for programmatic issue congruence between voters and their political representatives than dominant party systems with volatile opposition parties. To test this argument I compare Lesotho and Botswana. Both countries feature regular and fairly free elections, which so far resulted in dominant party systems where the same party holds more than 50 percent of the lower house seats in subsequent elections. However, in Botswana, a stable opposition embodied in the Botswana National Front (BNF) confronts the dominant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). In Lesotho, on the other hand, the dominant Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) faces a fluid and fragmented opposition. Accordingly, I expect to find more congruence on partisan policy preferences between political elites and voters in Botswana than in Lesotho. I measure the extent of elitemass partisan congruence by combining an original elite dataset and survey data.
Introduction
Africa's party systems are characterized by a lack of competition (Bogaards, 2000; Erdmann and Basedau, 2007) . 1 Therefore, many scholars consider African electoral democracies without the experience of a peaceful change of incumbency to be on a low democratic consolidation level per se (Bogaards, 2000; Huntington, 1991; Kotzé and Garcia-Rivero, 2008; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001) . 2 Even worse, according to Van de Walle (2003) , African dominant parties are usually accompanied by volatile opposition parties. Hence, there will be no prospect for competition in the future.
Contrary to this perspective, my present study argues that first, African dominant parties are not automatically accompanied by unstable opposition parties and second, dominant party systems with stable opposition parties induce the potential for less clientelistic-driven, more programmatic-driven party systems, and eventually more congruence between voters and their political representative's policy preferences, i.e. more responsive party systems. This in turn, enhances the probability for incumbeny change and/or democratic consolidation.
I argue that there are two types of dominant party systems in Africa. They are defined by their different proneness to incumbency change: One type is the dominant party facing a stable opposition and the other type is the dominant party facing a fluid and rather pulverized opposition (cf. van Eerd, 2010) . If the relevant opposition parties in a dominant party system change from one election to the next election, it is difficult for opposition voters to understand, which policy preferences their chosen opposition party and representatives represents. Likewise, new relevant opposition parties in the political arena will have minimal knowledge of their voters' policy preferences. However, if opposition parties remain stable from one election to the next, that signifies first, that they could withstand clientelistic co-optation by the dominant party (cf. with Van de Walle, 2003) , which enhances the probability for programmatic mobilization strategies (cf. Shefter, 1994) , and second, enables mutual learning and adaptation about the policy preferences of opposition parties and their voters. This leads to more congruence between voter's policy preferences and the preferences of their chosen political representatives, which means more democratic quality.
Figure 1 on p. 2 illustrates this argument: Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index functions here as a proxy for the extent of clientelistic mobilization strategies in African dominant party systems. Thereby, I assume that a high saliency of clientelistic mobilization strategies is nega-tively correlated with the predominance of programmatic mobilization strategies (cf. Kitschelt et al., 2009 ); programmatic mobilization strategies, which in turn enable congruence of policy preferences between voters and their political representatives. The figure demonstrates that African dominant party systems vary largely regarding the extent of perceived corruption and second, that this variation seems to be related to the stability of the opposition parties (measured by the legislative volatility of the opposition parties) (cf. van Eerd, 2010) . This substantiates my claim that first, dominant parties are not automatically accompanied by unstable opposition parties and second, dominant party systems with stable opposition parties have a potential for more programmatic congruence between voters and their political representatives.
However, because of the lack of a suitable indicator for programmatic congruence between political elites and voters in Africa, it is so far an untested hypothesis that dominant party systems with stable opposition parties lead to more programmatic and congruent African party systems.
To test this argument, based on the open accessible questions of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Kitschelt, forthcoming) , I conducted interviews with political elites in Botswana and Lesotho. I combine the out of this interviews assembled elite data with Afrobarometer mass survey data to measure the level of policy preference congruence in the two Southern African countries. The elite-mass combination will follow roughly Luna and Zechmeister's (2005) procedure, which they developed for comparing the policy preference congruence level in nine Latin American countries.
Additionally, I want to investigate under what circumstances program-matically responsive party systems come about in African dominant party systems. Likewise to the Latin American context, and as illustrated above with the volatility degrees of the opposition parties, one important correlate seems to be the institutionalization degree of the party system (cf. Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005) . Others possible correlates are the level of socioeconomic development, the existence of ethnopolitical cleavages, the electoral system and the geopolitical context during the introduction of regular and uninterrupted fairly free elections.
To test its argument, this study looks into Botswana and Lesotho's party systems. Figure 1 on p. 2 highlights Botswana and Lesotho as ideal cases for such a first test of measuring and comparing the degree of congruence between voter's policy preferences and their political representative's policy preferences in African electoral democracies. Both southern African cousin countries share many contextual variables but differ in the relevant independent variables: Lesotho's last parliamentary elections in 2007 resulted in a high volatility score of the opposition parties while Botswana's last parliamentary elections in 2009 reinforced the observer's impression of a comparatively stable opposition. These conditions are at the same time related to a context, which is friendly towards programmatic and congruent elite-mass preferences in Botswana and rather difficult in Lesotho. In what follows, first, I discuss the importance of policy preference congruence for African electoral democracies. Second, I present theoretical considerations on possible contextual correlates with programmatic responsiveness. Third, I discuss methods, data and case selection. Forth, I present the results. Finally, I reflect on the implications for other dominant party systems in Africa and discuss my further research agenda.
Programmatic Responsiveness and Democratic Consolidation in Africa
I understand "programmatic responsiveness", which is this study's focus, as "mandate representation". Mandate representation addresses the congruence between voter's policy preferences and their political representatives' policy preferences (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005) . It is one possible way to operationalize "democratic responsiveness", which Powell (2004) understands as a "chain of responsiveness", that links citizens' policy preferences with citizens' voting behavior, the election outcomes and the adopted public policies themselves. "Democratic responsiveness" legitimizes democracy itself by securing that governments adopt and implement the policies that arise from the will of the citizens. Of course, correspondence between citizens' policy preferences and their political representatives' preferences does not guarantee that the will of the electorate is implemented in concrete policies or even public outcomes, but it is an important prerequisite for democratic responsiveness.
A democracy is consolidated when "democrats can relax" (Schedler, 2001, 85) , i.e. reversal to an autocratic regime becomes unlikely. If democratically elected politicians reflect and implement the policy preferences of their constituencies, democracy performs well in the eyes of the average voter and democratic legitimacy is enhanced. Among African electoral democracies, where we find a prevalence of dominant party systems, it is pivotal to look at the the degree of programmatic responsiveness of the political system to judge the prospects of these young electoral democracies for democratic consolidation. A programmatically responsive dominant party system enhances its perceived legitimacy and ensures that opposition parties present an alternative government to the electorate, which in turn ensures increased accountability on the side of the government. In the long run, it makes incumbency change more likely because it allows opposition parties viable competitiveness without access to patronage resources (cf. Shefter, 1994; Van de Walle, 2003) . And peaceful change of incumbency would be the ultimate proof of democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1991) .
Of course, young African electoral democracies' level of programmatic responsiveness cannot be compared to more developed democracies. However, I expect to find variation within African electoral democracies, and especially within the bulk of African dominant party systems. Having found such a variation in my two test-cases of dominant party systems, I identify possible favorable conditions for programmatically responsive African dominant party systems.
Literature on the role of programmatic responsiveness 3 in the context of African electoral democracies' democratic consolidation is still underdeveloped. A large body of literature focuses on the outlying case South Africa, which is often more comparable with other newly industrialized countries or even old industrialized countries in the world than with other African countries. There exist some single-case studies of party systems and/or voter behavior across the continent (e.g. Crook, 1997; Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, 2005; Moser, 2008; MacArthur, 2008) . Especially Botswana has achieved quite some scholarly attention: According to Danevad (1995) , Botswana's dominant Party Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) is quite responsive although it is biased towards the policy preferences of the country's elite. However, the main opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) lacks responsiveness. It does not respond to the problem of rural poverty which is neglected by the BDP. Additionally, as a self-declared social-democratic party it lacks ties to the unions in Botswana. Emminghaus' (2003) more recent study supports this view. Wiseman (1998) points out to a ruralurban conflict in Botswana. However, the dominant BDP mobilizes in rural areas also by clientelistic means. Du Toit (1999) observes a rural-urban conflict as well. The BNF was successful in raising its urban support basis. Selolwane (2002) argues that the main opposition parties BNF and the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) made many strategic failures by -amongst others -failing to offer the electorate alternative policies regarding the economic management of the country. Molomo (2000) is skeptical about the strength of the opposition in Botswana as well (cf. also Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie, 2006) . Although they compelled the dominant BDP to be more responsive to the voters' need, Botswana's political landscape remains poor of ideology (Molomo, 2000) . Von Soest (2009) points out to the fact that the recent decreasing electoral strength and cohesion of the dominant BDP causes reversion to more clientelistic mobilization strategies by the governing party.
Lesotho generally suffers from scholarly neglect because it is surrounded by big neighbor South Africa which attracts most of the attention. Notable exeptions are Cho and Bratton (2006) who state that voting behavior in Lesotho is mainly explained by neopatrimonial clientelistic ties between the voters and the governing party Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). Pelham (2007) discusses the introduction of non-contributory old age pensions in Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa. The introduction of this policy build ties between voters and the dominant LCD in Lesotho. Coplan and Quinlan (1997) describe the historic differences between the forerunner of the LCD, the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), and the former dominant authoritarian Basotho National Party (BNP). The BCP was anti-tradition, anti-catholic and pan-African while the conservative BNP had strong ties with traditional chiefs and the catholic church. Olaleye (2003) criticizes Lesotho's political parties for having no ideology. However, he sees a potential for more programmatic responsiveness thanks to the abolishment of the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system and the introduction of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system in 2002. Luna and Zechmeister (2005, 392ff .) identify three relevant political determinants for programmatic responsiveness in the context of Latin American electoral democracies: Stability of the party system, the electoral system, and the existence of a strong ideological left. Leftist oriented parties structure party systems by presenting clear political alternatives. An additional determinant of programmatic responsiveness in Latin America is socioeconomic development.
As I present in the following possible contextual correlates with programmatic responsiveness in African dominant party systems, I will adopt some of Luna and Zechmeister's (2005) Latin American determinants to the African context.
But first of all, as already mentioned in the introductory section, I argue that there are two types of dominant party systems in Africa: One type is the dominant party facing a stable opposition and the other type is the dominant party facing a fluid and rather pulverized opposition (cf. van Eerd, 2010) . I argue that the first type provides more capacity for programmatic responsiveness as the latter because it enables mutual learning and adaptation processes between the electorate and the parties about their respective policy preferences.
Stability of the party system derives from Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) concept of party system institutionalization and can be adapted to Africa's prevailing dominant party systems (cf. van Eerd, 2010) . According to Mainwaring and Scully's definition, the competitive interactions of political parties have to follow certain stable patterns for voters to understand which interests the parties represent. Voters cannot hold the parties in charge accountable for a bad performance if parties appear and disappear from one election to the next. In such a situation, parties do not fulfill their role of linking society with the political system, i.e. the legitimacy of an electoral democracy is weak. A dominant party provides at least some amount of regularity because the individual voter always knows who is to blame in case of a political system's bad performance. However, if opposition parties in a dominant party system are unstable, voters will find no trustworthy alternative to cast their vote on. Hence, I only consider dominant party systems to be stable if the opposition parties are stable. This signifies that they developed some kind of immunity against clientelistic co-optation efforts by the dominant party and consequently that they have no resources for clientelistic mobilization at hand, which is an important precondition for programmatic mobilization (cf. Shefter, 1994; Van de Walle, 2003) . Eventually, they induce more programmatic mobilization strategies to the party system so that the dominant party itself is forced to offer more programmatic policies itself (which does not preclude that clientelistic strategies do not play a role anymore (Kitschelt et al., 2009) ). 4 Additionally, stable opposition parties are a bigger threat to the dominant party and this should in turn increase the dominant party's responsiveness regarding programmatic offerings. Accordingly, a stable dominant party system facilitates mutual learning and coordination between the electorate and their political representatives about their respective policy preferences (cf. Powell, 2004) . This should increase programmatic responsiveness. Luna and Zechmeister (2005) do not find strong evidence that the electoral system affects programmatic responsiveness in Latin America. However, the effect on programmatic responsiveness in African dominant party systems is still worth to investigate as Botswana uses the FPTP-system while Lesotho adopted the MMP-system in 2002. Huber and Powell (1994) observe bigger congruence between policymakers and the median voter in industrialized countries with proportional representation (PR) than in industrialized countries with FPTP. In FPTP-systems, coordination failures between competing parties are more likely (Powell, 2004) while FPTP is additionally more conductive for individual politicians to campaign on personal platforms then on coherent national party platforms (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Hix, 2004; Holmberg, 2009) . Hence, programmatic responsiveness should be stronger in more proportional systems than in FPTP-systems. Luna and Zechmeister (2005) find that leftist oriented parties structure party systems by presenting clear political alternatives. However, most African parties carry leftist ideology only in their party name but not in their concrete policy ideas. Accordingly, Bogaards (2004, 178) laments the inexistence of mass parties in African electoral democracies. Randall (2001) as well observes a lack of class consciousness in African electoral democracies. However, as I have variance on this variable in Botswana and Lesotho, it will still be interesting to investigate if African parties with some remains of left ideology are able to structure the party system towards more responsiveness. Particularly interesting here is the geopolitical context during the formation of the party system at the beginning of regular and uninterrupted fairly free elections. Most African electoral democracies, also Lesotho, experienced shortly after independence a breakdown of their democratic institutions to become dominant authoritarian party systems. Most of them regained democratic institutions only after the end of the Cold War. Botswana is an exception as it is continuously democratic since its independence in 1966.
One important determinant of programmatic responsiveness in Latin America is socioeconomic development (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005) . Not only the political parties are responsible for programmatic responsiveness but also the citizenry has to deliver a fair share of political sophistication for programmatic responsiveness to work (cf. Powell, 2004) . If citizens are illiterate and are uncertain about their own policy positions, it is difficult for them to vote coherently. Likewise, poor and uneducated citizens are more prone towards clientelistic mobilization strategies (Kitschelt, 2000) .
According to Randall (2001, 244) , ethnicity and regionalism are the "most fundamental cleavages within African societies." Hence, as long as they do not correlate strongly with other policy positions, which, of course, may be the case, I expect them to distort policy congruence between parties and their electorate. This does not preclude that ethnicity and regionalism may be policy issues themselves, on which party-voter policy congruence may be investigated. Powell (2004, 99) notes that even the most programmatically responsive parties may not be able to deliver their policy promises when in government because of international factors as the present global economic condition or other pressures from external actors. Although I do not investigate the actual implementation or outcomes of policies, this is still an important factor in the African context. Many African countries are under a lot of exter-nal pressure from international organizations as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or donor countries, which dictate the adoption of rather neoliberal policies like privatization efforts in exchange for loans and investments. Envisioning such external policy pressures, at least governing parties might hesitate to promise antagonistic policies, even if they are demanded by their electorate. has not yet released the data, which is based on expert interviews. Apart from adding a new country to the project -Lesotho -I conducted the interviews with parliamentarians and party cadre instead of independent experts. By that, I except to operationalize programmatic responsiveness on a more proximate basis. Additionally, because the interviews have been conducted with three representatives per relevant party per country instead of one expert for one country, I am also able to draw conclusions about the internal party cohesiveness on different policy preferences. Afrobarometer indicates citizen's party affiliations by asking respondents which party they would vote for were an election held that day.
Methods and Data

Case Selection
The study tests its argument by looking into Botswana and Lesotho's party systems. As we could see in figure 1 on p. 2 and in the previous section this two southern African culturally cousin countries are ideal cases because they share many contextual variables but differ in the relevant independent variables (cf. Lijphart, 1975; Lieberman, 2005) .
Both countries have been british protectorates, which benefited the colonizers as well as the colonized in fending off the Boers. Both gained independence in 1966 and established parliamentarian democracies. Botswana became a parliamentary republic, Lesotho a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. The two countries are culturally related as both belong to the Sotho-Tswana Bantu language sub-group. The Basotho are the only ethnic group in Lesotho while the Tswana (eight 'major' tribes) form an 80 percent ethnic dominance in Botswana while the remaining 20 percent are constituted by the ethnically distinct 'minority' tribes. Both countries have a traditional chief system, which parallels and complements the modern government structures. The paramount chiefs of both countries have seats in the countries' respective mainly advisory second chamber. Both countries confront the poorly resourced opposition parties with difficult geographical conditions for efficient political mobilization of their respective population of approximate two million people: Botswana has the size of France, which entails a vastly scattered population with large driving distances between settlement areas. Additionally, the more north the more the roads become dirt-or deserttracks demanding large four-wheel drives. Lesotho's mountainous topography entails many remote settlement areas, which sometimes are only reachable on horseback or by helicopter because of challenging road conditions or because there are no roads at all. As neighboring countries of South Africa, both countries are in the sphere of influence of the regional leading power (cf. several interviews conducted in Botswana and Lesotho, 2010; Düsing, 2002; Good, 2008; Maundeni, 2001; Coplan, 1997; Olaleye 2003) . Last but not least, both countries feature dominant party systems with Botswana's BDP having a comfortable absolute majority in parliament since independence while Lesotho's LCD inherited an absolute majority from its forerunner BCP (Basotho Congress Party) in 1998 and retained this dominance in 2002 and 2007.
The two countries differ regarding the condition of the opposition. Botswana's BDP is confronted with a rather stable, although in some elections very weak opposition embodied in the BNF and since 1999 also BNF's splinter party BCP (Botswana Congress Party). Lesotho's opposition is unstable and highly fragmented. The 2007 elections have been contested by 22 political parties (interview with a representative of Lesotho's Independent Electoral Commission [IEC], 2010) . Botswana uses the FPTP-system in single-member constituencies while Lesotho adopted the MMP-system in 2002 with 80 seats in single-member constituencies using the FPTP and 40 seats in one national constituency using party-list proportional representation. Botswana experienced uninterrupted fairly free and regular elections since 1966 while Lesotho's electoral cycle was disrupted in 1970 by the BNP who established a dominant authoritarian party system, which came to an end in 1986 by a military coup and led the way for the first fairly free elections since 1970 in 1993 (Nunley, 2009 ). Regarding socioeconomic development Botswana is one of the few middle income countries in Africa while Lesotho belongs to the lower income countries (IMF, 2010) .
I restrain the case selection of political parties that I examine to the currently three most relevant parties in Botswana and in Lesotho. These are the BDP, BNF and BCP in Botswana and the LCD, All Basotho Convention (ABC) and BNP in Lesotho. This is due to pragmatic as well as qualitative reasons: Pragmatically, there are no Afrobarometer respondents for some of the other parties in the two countries. Qualitatively, due to internal conflicts, Lesotho's BNP was very weak in the 2007 elections. However, many respondents of the Afrobarometer survey identify with this party, and many experts underline the importance of the former dominant authoritarian BNP because of its historic position in Lesotho and the relatively significant resources it still holds (several expert and elite interviews conducted in Lesotho, 2010) . The elite data is put together by in each case three interviews with representatives from the two most important parties in the two countries (BDP and BNF in Botswana, LCD and ABC in Lesotho) and by two interviews with representatives from the smaller party in the two countries (BCP in Botswana, BNP in Lesotho). The selection of the respondents followed the rough guideline to reach some representativeness by including a mixture of party cadre, ministers and parliamentarians (sometimes in double function) with rural and urban background per each party. Of course, with such small samples per each party, distortions cannot be foreclosed entirely.
Survey Variables for Measuring Programmatic Responsiveness
The challenge here is to find Afrobarometer variables that capture the policy dimensions asked in the elite interviews. The questions in the elite interviews focus on three policy dimensions: Economic (four questions), ethnic (one question; only for Botswana because Lesotho is ethnically homogenous) and conservative versus liberal (one question). Additionally, the elite interviews ask about the main problems in the country and the main programmatic offers of respective party the respondent belongs to. Last but not least, there are questions about linkages towards specific groups in civil society (two questions) and the main target group in election campaigns (one question). The most proximate Afrobarometer questions are described and matched with the elite interview questions in tables 1-4 on pages 12-14.
Measurement of Programmatic Responsiveness
I am interested in the degree of congruency between voter's policy preferences and their political representatives' policy preferences. In examining the degree of congruence between partisan voters and party representatives' policy preference ordering and the degree of clear policy distinctness between on the one hand representatives and on the other hand voters of different parties, I am able to measure the degree of programmatic responsiveness (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005) .
I measure coherent ordering by correlating the mean placements of the party elites and party voters on every issue in table 1 on p. 12. Note that for most of the policy sub-dimensions these are several correlation coefficients, from which I will compute the mean correlation coefficient. I do this due to the fact that it is hard to find Afrobarometer questions, which address the same policy dimensions as the elite interviews. Accordingly, to err on the safe side, I correlate one sub-dimension of the elite interviews with -if possible -several Afrobarometer questions that are proximate to the respective sub-dimension (cf. table 1). As suggested by Luna and Zechmeister (2005) , I aggregate the means of the correlation results into three categories: strong correlation (r > .30), weak correlation (−.30 < r < .30) and strong negative correlation (r < −.30). I use smaller correlation thresholds than Luna and Zechmeister because I assume that African party systems are generally to a lesser degree programmatically developed than Latin American party systems.
To measure significant mass divide between different partisan voters I use analysis of variance (ANOVA) (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005) . However, the elite data's number of cases are to few for reliable ANOVA. In such a case, qualitatively acceptable mean differences with small intra-party ranges indicate an acceptable although cautiously interpretable elite divide. Out of this procedure result four policy division categories: significant elite divide/significant mass divide, significant elite divide/no significant mass divide, no significant elite divide/significant mass divide and no significant elite divide/no significant mass divide (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005) . Luna and Zechmeister (2005) combine the three correlation categories and four party division categories in twelve categories of responsiveness. With this twelve categories we can assess the degree of programmatic responsiveness on every policy sub-dimension in table 1. The twelve categories of responsiveness are depicted in table 5 on p. 15 (cells 1 to 12).
Clearly, the upper left cell (cell 1) in table 1 where there is a strong pos- 
Public Spending
A question asked whether the party of the respondent supports extensive public provisions like oldaged pension benefits or free primary school for everyone. Scale: 1 (extensive public spending) till 10 (no public spending at all) (cf. Kitschelt, forthcoming).
A question asked whether free schooling is better, even if the quality of education is low. Scale: 1 (agree strongly) till 4 (better to pay school fees) (Afrobarometer 2005, q10 , only Botswana).
A question asked about highest level of education respondent has completed. Code: 0 (post-secondary qualification or higher), 1 (secondary school or lower) (Afrobarometer 2008, q89 recoded) . A question if government's economic policies (i.e. neoliberalism) have helped most people. Scale: 1 (hurt most people) till 4 (agree strongly) (Afrobarometer 2008, q11 inverted) .
Privatization
A question asked whether the party of the respondent supports state intervention in private economic activity. Scale: 1 (extensive state intervention) till 10 (no state intervention at all) (cf. Kitschelt, forthcoming).
A question asked whether the costs of reforming the economy are too high (i.e. more neoliberalism). Scale: 1 (agree strongly) till 4 (one has to accept some hardships). (Afrobarometer 2008, q10) . A question asked if international businesses and investors have the right amount of influence over government. Scale: 1 (too much) till 5 (too little) (Afrobarometer 2008, q99b inverted) .
Left-Right
A question asked whether the party of the respondent is best located on the left or right of the national political spectrum. Scale: 1 (extreme left) till 10 (extreme right) (cf. Kitschelt, forthcoming).
A question asked whether the costs of reforming the economy are too high (i.e. more neoliberalism). Scale: 1 (agree strongly) till 4 (one has to accept some hardships). (Afrobarometer 2008, q10) . itive correlation regarding the ordering of the elite and mass partisan mean positions and a significant divide between on the one hand partisan elites of different parties and on the other hand a significant divide between partisan voters of different parties indicates strong programmatic responsiveness of the party system. Contrarily, the upper right cell (cell 9) indicates a strong failure in the responsiveness of the party system as partisan elites and voters are clearly divided within but in the opposite ordering regarding each other. Accordingly, programmatic responsiveness declines in cells 2 to 4 while the potential for failure of responsiveness lessens from cell 10 to 12. Cells 5 to 8 are ambiguous cases where there is no coherent ordering although there are sometimes clear divides within the masses and/or the political elites. We cannot know if such policy dimension turn out to be failures or success' of responsiveness in the future (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005) . The scoring (2.0 --2.0 in table 5) works analogously. Bigger values mean stronger programmatic responsiveness while zero values mean no programmatic responsiveness to the point of negative values, which mean programmatic responsiveness failures. The scoring's purpose is for comparing the degree of programmatic responsiveness of the party systems of Botswana and Lesotho and could be adapted to larger comparisons with further African countries (cf. Luna and Zechmeister, 2005) . The responsiveness measurement of the party linkages with specific groups in civil society, election campaign targeting of specific groups and the statements of country problems is simpler (tables 2-4 on p. 14). I just compare if some parties are significantly more popular among some groups than other parties and examine if the respective parties react to that by establishing explicit linkages or targeting strategies toward this groups in election cam-paigns. Last but not least, I analyze if party elites and partisan voters have the same problems at heart when they look at the state of their country. By that, I hope to gain additional information about latently virulent programmatic issues and responsiveness in the respective country.
Comparing Degrees of Programmatic Responsiveness in Botswana and Lesotho
Tables 6 and 7 on p. 22 display the distribution of the six, respectively five policy sub-dimensions of table 1 (see p. 12) -social redistribution, public spending, privatization and left-right (economic policy dimension), ethnicity (ethnic policy dimension, only Botswana) and traditional values and customs (liberal-conservative policy dimension) -for Botswana (table 6) and Lesotho (table 7) regarding the degree of programmatic responsiveness of the respective party system. Botswana's party system displays a rather acceptable picture of programmatic responsiveness as two economic policy sub-dimension fall into the cell with a responsiveness score of 1.5 (privatization and left-right), which signifies a significant elite divide and a coherent policy position ordering between the partisan voters and their respective party representatives, although no significant partisan mass divide. Two policy sub-dimension fall into the cell with a responsiveness score of 1.0 (ethnicity as well as traditional values and customs), which indicates a significant partisan mass division and a coherent ordering, however no significant partisan elite divide. Two economic policy sub-dimensions are totally irrelevant as they fall into the cell, where there is neither a division within the partisan elites and the partisan mass nor a consistent preference ordering between the partisan elites and the partisan mass (social redistribution and public spending, scoring of 0.0) (table 6).
In Lesotho, programmatic responsiveness seems to be slightly weaker as we find a significant divide among partisan voters for three economic policy sub-dimensions, which are not reflected by a significant divide among the partisan elites but feature a coherent policy preference ordering between partisan voters and their respective partisan elites (social redistribution, public spending and left-right, scoring of 1.0). One economic policy sub-dimension is neither coherently ordered nor is there a significant divide within the partisan elites and partisan mass (privatization, scoring of 0.0). One policy sub-dimension, traditional values and customs, even suggests a potential failure of programmatic responsiveness in Lesotho's party system as we find a reversed policy preference ordering between partisan voters and their respective partisan representatives. However, the division is neither significant within the partisan elites nor within the partisan masses (scoring of -0.5).
There are four possible ways how we might systematize a comparison regarding strength of programmatic responsiveness in Botswana and Lesotho's party systems (see table 8 on p. 22):
The first way is to compare the two scoring means of the three, respectively two policy dimensions for Botswana and Lesotho (economic, ethnic and liberal-conservative for Botswana, economic and liberal-conservative for Lesotho), whereas the value for the economic policy dimension is in turn composited by the mean of the four scorings for the policy sub-dimensions social redistribution, public spending, privatization and left-right. Thereby, we receive a total programmatic responsiveness score of 0.92 for Botswana and 0.125 for Lesotho.
The second way is to look exclusively at the score of the policy dimension where the respective party system reaches the highest scoring and discard the scoring of the other policy dimensions. Also here, Botswana's party system reaches a slightly better value with 1.0 (ethnic or liberal-conservative policy dimensions) whereas Lesotho's party system obtains a value of 0.75 for the economic policy dimension (mean value of the four economic policy sub-dimensions).
The third and fourth way is to discard the concept of policy dimension and regard every policy sub-dimension as an independent policy dimension. If we than compute the means of the six, respectively five policy subdimensions all together or look exclusively at the policy sub-dimension with the highest scoring, again, Botswana's party system prevails regarding its strength of programmatic responsiveness with values of 0.83, respectively 1.5 (privatization or left-right) vis-à-vis Lesotho with 0.5, respectively 1 (social redistribution, public spending or left-right).
Accordingly, I can safely assume that Botswana's party system is programmatically more responsive than Lesotho's party system. In what follows, we look into the details of the programmatic responsiveness degree of the individual policy dimensions and sub-dimensions in the two countries.
Regarding the economic policy sub-dimension of privatization Botswana displays a rather strong responsiveness score of 1.5 (table 6). As displayed in the summary statistics of Botswana's party elite data in the appendix section (tables 17-19 on p. 36) we observe a clear party elite divide on the privatization sub-dimension in Botswana as the dominant party BDP reaches a mean of 7.7 (mode: 9) 6 on a scale from 1 to 10 whereby 1 means in favor of state intervention and 10 in favor of privatization. Note that all variables in this paper are coded as such that small values indicate 'leftist' or liberal policy positions while big values indicate 'rightist' or conservative policy positions. The BCP reaches a very consistent medium position with a mean of 5.5 (mode: 5.5) whereas the BNF takes a very consistent 'leftist' position by reaching a mean of 2.7 (mode: 3). The partisan voters are not significantly divided in the two corresponding Afrobarometer variables, however they 'line up' in the same order as their respective partisan representatives by reaching a mean Person's r of .84.
We see the same picture if we look at the left-right placements of the partisan elites in Botswana. Again, the dominant BDP takes the most rightist position as the BDP representatives ascribe their party a mean leftright position of 6 (mode: 5) whereas the BNF and its splinter BCP go together with a mean of 4 (mode: 4). Although the parties are rather close regarding their mean left-right placements, their respective elites have a rather strong intra-party consistency (see respective ranges and values in tables 17-20). Hence, it is save to speak about a significant party elite divide regarding the left-right sub-dimension. If we look at the matched Afrobarometer question, we observe a coherent ordering as the BDP voters are more willing to accept some economic hardships caused by neo-liberal policies than the BNF and BCP voters (r = .75). However the partisan mass divide on this issue does not reach significance.
The remaining two economic policy sub-dimensions, social redistribution and public spending, are not salient in Botswana's party system. We find within every party elite respondents who ascribe their party the advocation of extensive social spending that redistributes income in favor of disadvantaged strata. Paradoxically, the self-proclaimed social democratic BNF takes here the most 'rightist' position (mean of 2.67, mode of 3 vis-à-vis 1.67 [mode: 1] and 1.5 [mode: 1.5] for the BDP and BCP). Likewise, we find in every party partisan elite respondents who ascribe their party the advocation of extensive public provision of benefits such as free primary school or pension benefits. Again, the BNF is most rightist with a mean of 2 and a maximum of 4 (see tables [17] [18] [19] [20] . Regarding the matched Afrobarometer variables for social redistribution we find no consistent pattern within the partisan mass as the division is for both variables insignificant. Regarding the variable if civil servants should keep their job the ordering is in line with the partisan elites (r = 0.84). However, it is in the opposite ordering for the variable if the partisan voters favor the government's neo-liberal policies as BNF voters respond most 'leftist' (r = -0.49). The same verdict applies for the matched public spending variables: BNF voters are for free schooling although their partisan representatives ascribe their party the most rightist position on this policy.
Partisan elite respondents do not divide at all on the issue of ethnicity in Botswana. With one exception, every party representative ascribes its party full toleration of minority ethnic groups (see tables 17-20). However, the partisan masses are clearly divided on this issues as there is significant mass division in every of the three matched Afrobarometer variables. Speakers of minority languages are to be found mainly among BCP voters whereas Setswana speakers are mainly BDP and BNF voters. Because of the slightly stronger majority culture advocative stance of the BNF partisan elites, the elite-mass ordering is coherent. The same pattern appears with the 'tribe' variable where minority tribe voters are significantly more likely to be found among BCP voters than among BDP or BNF voters. BCP voters are also more 'ethnically sensitive' as they feel less 'Motswana' (demonym, a person from Botswana) and more ethnic than BDP or BNF voters. As there is significant ethnic division among the partisan mass, I wonder if party elite respondents distorted the interviews regarding the ethnicity question because of political correctness towards an 'outsider'. 7 A similar, although less straightforward pattern appears regarding the liberal-conservative policy dimension in Botswana. Apart from the BNF, the party representatives are not consistent in their ascriptions of their party's position regarding individual freedom from state interference into private issues or government enforcement of traditional customs and values. The BDP representative range from 1 (full individual freedom) to 5 while the BCP representatives range from 1 to 3 (see tables [17] [18] [19] [20] . Yet, on four of the seven matched Afrobarometer variables partisan voters are significantly divided (question whether people are like children and government like parent, question about the influence of traditional leaders, question whether democracy is always preferable, age of the partisan voters [hypothesis: the older, the more conservative]). The ordering is mostly coherent with the respective party representatives. As the BCP is most liberal and the BDP most conservative, BCP voters are significantly younger, more to be found among urban voters, less religious, more skeptical towards traditional leaders and disagree significantly more with the sentence that people are like children and government should take care of them like a parent. In turn, BDP and BNF voters are older, more to be found among rural voters, more religious, more in favor of traditional leaders -here, the BNF voters are even most favorable of the three parties towards traditional leaders -and agree more with the sentence that people are like children. BNF and BDP voters go mostly hand in hand regarding this liberal-conservative issues. Contraintuitively, BCP voters are not as convinced as BDP and BNP voters that democracy is always preferable.
Lesotho's party elites are not significantly divided regarding the economic policy sub-dimension of social redistribution. We find both among LCD and ABC party elite respondents who ascribe their party advocation of extensive social spending that redistributes income to benefit lower strata. Only BNP party elite respondents ascribe their party a more 'rightist' although not very consistent position as they assign values of 3 and 7 (see tables 21-24 in the appendix section on pages 38-39). In turn, the partisan voters divide significantly amongst themselves and coherently ordered with their respective political representatives. Regarding the matched Afrobarometer variable if the government's rather neo-liberal policies hurt most people the ABC voters are -as their elite counterparts -most leftist while the BNP and the LCD voters are less critical.
The same pattern appears regarding the economic policy sub-dimension of public spending. Again, we find both among the LCD and ABC party elite respondents who ascribe their party most 'leftist' positions of advocation of extensive provision of public benefits like free primary and secondary school as well as pension benefits. Again, the ABC is most 'leftist' while the LCD takes a moderate position and the BNP is most 'rightist' (see tables 21-24). Again, the partisan mass is significantly divided amongst themselves and coherently ordered with their respective political representatives regarding the assessment of neo-liberal policies. Additionally, the more educated are significantly more to be found among ABC voters than among LCD and BNP voters. Regarding the issue of free schooling -as people who enjoyed the highest education in the country -I assume that they are more 'leftist'.
Lesotho's party representatives are rather inconsistent regarding the economic policy sub-dimension of privatization. Among the LCD respondents ascriptions are maximally inconsistent as they assign the values 1, 5 and 10! ABC party elites are more consistent as two respondents ascribe their party the advocation of extensive state intervention. However, one respondent declared that his party has no clear position on this issue (denoted as missing value in table 24). This indicates deficient intra-party consistency. The BNP takes an intermediate position on privatization (see tables 21-24). The partisan mass are not significantly divided, neither. Interestingly, there is even a slight responsiveness failure as LCD voters are most critical of international businesses and investors although their party is most in favor of privatization.
Lesotho's party respresentatives are divided significantly regarding leftright ascriptions. LCD representatives ascribe their party the most left position (mean and mode of 3) while the ABC takes a moderate position of 5 and the BNP a right position of a mean and mode of 7.5. However, one of three LCD elite respondents and two of three ABC elite respondents stated that their party has no clear left-right position (denoted as missing value in table 24). I compensated for this intra-party inconsistency by assigning only a score of 1.0 instead of 1.5 for programmatic responsiveness (see table 7 ). The partisan mass order coherently, yet they are not significantly divided regarding the corresponding Afrobarometer variable.
Regarding the liberal-conservative policy dimension I observe a clear programmatic responsiveness failure. However, the failure carries not to much weight as the divides are insignificant within the partisan elite as well as within the partisan mass. Within the LCD and the ABC, there are large inconsistencies of the partisan elites' liberal-conservative ascriptions for their respective parties. They range from 1 (full individual freedom) to 5 and one ascription that the party has no clear position on this issue for the LCD and a range of 1 to 8 for the ABC. The BNP elites ascribe their party a liberal position with a mean/mode of 1.5 (see tables 21-24). However, on six of the seven matched Afrobarometer variables the partisan voters position themselves in the opposite order than their respective party representatives. ABC voters are generally the most liberal while the BNP voters are the most conservative. The ordering is only coherent as the BNP voters are the least skeptical about the Chinese influence on their country. However, most of the mass divides are not significant. Yet, ABC voters are significantly younger and more to be found among urban voters whereas BNP voters are the oldest and significantly more to be found among rural voters. This is incoherent with the respective partisan elite positions as well if we hypothesize that younger and urban voters are more liberal as older and rural voters.
In sum, as hypothesized, Botswana's party system is programmatically more responsive than Lesotho's party system. The two party systems are rather equally responsive if we look at the economic policy dimension. However, I presented evidence for a responsiveness failure of Lesotho's party system regarding the liberal-conservative policy dimension.
In Botswana, partisan elites are significantly divided on the two economic sub-dimensions privatization and left-right. They coherently line up with their partisan voters, which are not significantly divided, though. However, the two economic dimensions social redistribution and public spending lack any significance in Botswana's party system as the elites and the mass are not consistently divided amongst themselves. Interestingly, Botswana's oldest opposition party BNF seems to have lost touch with its electorate and causes a potential responsiveness failure as it takes the most 'rightist' positions on this two economic sub-dimensions -as a self-proclaimed traditionally socialdemocratic party -whereas its electorate takes the most 'leftist' positions on such issues! Probably, the internal conflicts and disorganization since its split on the eve of the 1999 elections, which gave birth to the BCP, caused such responsiveness incoherences (interviews conducted with experts and elites in Botswana, 2010).
In Lesotho, the partisan voters present clear responsiveness potential on the economic policy sub-dimensions of social redistribution and public spending. ABC voters take the most 'leftist' positions on the corresponding Afrobarometer variables while the BNP voters take the most 'rightist' positions and the LCD voters an intermediate position. However, the LCD and BNP party elites are internally to inconsistent to be responsive enough towards their voters intermediate and 'rightist' positions. Lesotho's party elites are more consistent regarding their left-right placements as they ascribe their parties a rather left (LCD), respectively clear right (BNP) position. Yet, two out of three ABC party elites state that their party has no clear position on the left-right position. Hence, they are missing the chance to be more responsive towards their latent 'leftist' electorate.
The privatization economic sub-dimension clearly demonstrates the dilemma every democratically governing party faces in low-income countries, which are dependent on loans and investments from external international organizations and donors. Caused by external pressures, Lesotho's govern- ing party LCD was forced to implement privatization policies and economic reforms, which disillusioned many voters. Accordingly, the partisan elites of the LCD were not sure to ascribe their party the actual policy implementations of privatization or the more responsive, yet not implementable policies of state intervention (interviews conducted with experts and elites in Lesotho, 2010), which are demanded by the majority of the LCD voters. Interestingly, we find significant ethnic divisions among partisan voters in Botswana. It is doubtful that the partisan elites do not want to make profit out of that fact, even as they stated otherwise in the interviews. Neither the BDP nor the BNF politicians advocated policies favoring the Tswana-majority although they are significantly more favored by Tswana voters than by minority voters who are significantly more in favor of the BCP. This maybe a sign of political correctness towards an outsider or a sign of political ethics as they do not want to fuel ethnic tensions, which can be observed in so many African states.
There is large programmatic potential for a liberal-conservative divide as the voters of the old parties BDP and BNF are clearly more conservative than the voters of the newer party BCP. Obviously, the voters of the old parties are only divided on economic issues but not on liberal-conservative issues. If the party elites would be more internally consistent on this issue, they probably could mobilize more voters.
Programmatic responsiveness on the liberal-conservative policy dimension tips the scales that Lesotho's party system is in sum programmatically less responsive than Botswana's party system. Although there are no significant divides on both sides of the political food chain, ABC and BNP party elites ascribe their respective parties the opposite positions of its respective electorate. ABC voters are the most liberal while the BNP are the most traditional and conservative. Historically, BNP used to be responsive to its conservative electorate. Obviously, they are now moving towards a more liberal position and seem to forget about the preferences of their traditional electorate. This programmatic failure may be explained by the disorganization and internal factionalism that plagues the BNP in recent years (interviews conducted with experts and elites in Lesotho, 2010) . The failure of the ABC may be explained by the fact that the party is new to the political 'game' in Lesotho.
Tables 9-16 on pages 25-28 complete the picture of programmatic responsiveness in Botswana and Lesotho by looking into existing or latent programmatic linkages between parties and their electorate.
In Botswana, women are significantly more likely to be found among BDP voters. Accordingly, one of the three BDP party elite respondents confirms a strong linkage with women's organizations in Botswana. This indicates some responsiveness and discerns the BDP from its competitors which negate any linkages with women's organizations (table 9) .
In Lesotho, women are also more prone to vote for the governing party than men (note that the divide does not reach significance here). However, the LCD lacks responsiveness by not forming any linkages with women's organizations in Lesotho (table 10) . Table 12 demonstrates impressively that the old roman catholic/anticatholic cleavage is still an issue in Lesotho. Roman catholic voters are significantly more to be found among BNP voters and significantly less among LCD voters. However, the parties are not anymore responsive towards this latent division as no one of the party elite respondents confirms any linkages with religious organizations. Assuming that roman catholic voters are more conservative and tradition-oriented, the BNP again makes a responsiveness failure of not reacting on the traditional and conservative preferences of its electorate.
As we can see in table 13, at least one of the BDP elite respondents ascribes his party responsiveness towards rural voters and confirms rural vote targeting by the BDP ("If you win the rural vote, you win the elections in Botswana!" [BDP party elite respondent, Interview in Botswana, 2010] ). The BNF again makes a responsiveness failure as it misses the newest developments of losing the urban voters to its descendant BCP: One BNF elite confirms urban vote targeting, although the party's support base is nowequally with the BDP -rural. Meanwhile, the BCP misses the opportunity to be more responsive towards its urban support base as no BCP elite respondent confirms explicit targeting of urban vothers.
The same goes for Lesotho's ABC in table 14 as the ABC is not responsive enough towards it significantly more urban support base. However, the BNP is here more responsive as it reacts on its overwhelmingly rural support base. Tables 15 und 16 show the two party system's ranking of country problems by the partisan elite and their respective electorate.
There is a small government/opposition divide within Botswana's elite as BDP elites only state the problem of unemployment in the country and that they promise to fight against it. The opposition parties BNF and BCP attack the government by underlining that they would change the way the economy is managed. Other than that, the BNF again fails to occupy new policy space by prioritizing the same problems as the governing party: Aids and Education. Two issues, which are not anymore to be found among the top priorities of any partisan electorate in Botswana. In case of the BDP elite respondents, it seems that they want to rest on their laurels by emphasizing problems that they tackled rather successfully in the past and are not as virulent anymore amongst their electorate. The BCP elite is most responsive as they emphasize economic problems, which seem to be overwhelmingly virulent among their electorate. Botswana's partisan mass in turn is divided regarding the BDP voters' emphasis on problems of crime (no responsiveness on the elite side), BNF voters's emphasis on agriculture (no responsiveness on the elite side, indicates again the decline of the BNF urban vote) and BCP voter's emphasis on incomes, wages and salaries (responsiveness on the elite side, indicates again the significance of the BCP urban vote). Lesotho's partisan elite respondent's divide more impressively than Botswana's partisan elites as LCD partisan elites emphasize education, unemployment and political instability, whereas the ABC partisan elites emphasize corruption, crime, agriculture and infrastructure and BNP partisan elites emphasize the management of the economy, agriculture and famine. However, they produce many responsiveness failures as the LCD and ABC partisan voters have the same problems at heart which are only to a small degree captured by their respective representatives: unemployment, poverty, famine and infrastructure. The governing LCD makes probably the same mistake as the governing BDP in Botswana as it emphasizes past achievements as free education and more political stability, which are not that vir- In sum, regarding latent programmatic linkages as well, Botswana's party system is slightly more responsive than Lesotho's party system.
Favorable Conditions for Programmatic Responsiveness
As hypothesized in the introductory and theoretical section, Botswana's party system is programmatically more responsive towards the electorate than Lesotho's party system. However, the margin is less impressive as assumed considering Botswana's positive image as an "African miracle" of stability and prosperity and its impressive history of uninterrupted fairly free multiparty elections. Note, that Lesotho turned back on the track of fairly free multiparty elections only in 1993 and experienced severe political unrest after the 1998 elections, which led to a change of the electoral system from FPTP to MMP.
As the most prominent explanation for stronger programmatic responsiveness, I put forward Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) concept of party system institutionalization and adopted it to Africa's prevalent dominant party systems. Obviously, Botswana's dominant party BDP, which is since independence confronted by the same stable opponent BNF, with the BCP joining the competition in 1999, is forced by that fact to keep on doing a (Nunley, 2009) . 8 With such a volatile opposition, it is actually a miracle that we find some programmatic responsiveness in Lesotho's party system at all. Voters had to deal with a completely new strongest opposition party, which did not exist less than a half year before the elections. And in turn the ABC could not have had enough time to be completely responsive towards the preferences of its latent support base.
Some amount of programmatic responsiveness in Lesotho may be explained by the introduction of the more proportionate MMP electoral-system in 2002 which gives the parties and their national policy platforms more visibility than in Botswana's person-centered FPTP system.
In Botswana, partisan elite are highly intra-party consistent and fairly inter-party divided regarding their left-right and privatization placements. This is partly due to the fact that Botswana had the advantage of experiencing uninterrupted and fairly free multiparty elections since the formation of the party system in 1966. Botswana's parties formed during a period of a highly ideologized geopolitical context. Accordingly, the BDP gave itself a more conservative and capitalist profile while the BNF adopted a socialist self-image, which turned into a social-democratic profile after the end of the cold-war. As these ideological roots have never been interrupted by phases of authoritarian government as in other African countries like Lesotho, the BDP and BNF could consolidate their ideological profiles and the people could establish consolidated expectations about the policy positions of the BDP and the BNF.
However, the BNF's disappointment of the lost 1994 elections, where incumbency change was within reach, and the subsequent split, which gave birth to the BCP for the 1999 elections must have shaken the ideological consistency and programmatic responsiveness of the BNF. Since then, the BNF becomes more disorganized and internally divided (interviews with political experts and politicians in Botswana, 2010). As a result, programmatic responsiveness declines: As my study shows, the BNF moves now more towards the right and the position of the BDP on the economic dimension. By that, it is not responsive to its electorate anymore and does not gain new electorates, which are already loyal to the BDP. At the same time, it loses voters to the BCP, which is able to mobilize people on the liberalconservative policy dimension: By that, the BCP snags the only recently gained urban, youth, minority tribe and urban vote from the BNF. BNFs decline is a symptom of a party system in change: Recently last year, the BDP experienced its first severe internal split, which gave birth to the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD), which raises a new issue on Botswana's political agenda: more civil liberties and more intra-party democracy (in-terviews conducted with political experts and politician in Botswana, 2010). It is very likely, that Botswana's party system becomes temporarily more unstable and less programmatically responsive in the future. Additionally, the governing BDP may invest in more clientelistic mobilization strategies to counteract the looming break-away of large shares of its electorate to the new competitor BMD (cf. von Soest, 2009 ). These recent developments may explain the disappointing margin of programmatic responsiveness strength vis-à-vis Lesotho's party system.
Lesotho never experienced such a salient left-right division between the founding parties BCP (LCD's forerunner) and BNP. However, the BNP was more nationalist, capitalist, more conservative, pro traditional leaders and catholic while the BCP was more pan-African, less capitalist, less conservative, anti traditional leaders and anti-catholic. These divisions were disrupted by the disruption of the electoral cycle in 1970 when the BNP established itself as the dominant authoritarian party. However, we can observe that the BNP electorate is still more nationalist, more conservative, pro traditional leaders and significantly more catholic: a huge potential for voter mobilization by the BNP! However, the party is not responsive as it gives itself a more liberal self-image than in the past. Maybe, the internal disorganizations and factionalisms in recent years causes this programmatic responsiveness failure (interviews conducted with political experts and politicians in Lesotho, 2010) . The recently formed ABC makes the mistake the other way round as it tries to win the favor of traditional leaders and conservative electorates while its support basis is more liberal, urban, young and educated.
Clearly, one important explanation lies in the socioeconomic development of the two countries. Botswana is much more developed in every respect. Its parties have more resources at hand and its citizens are more educated. Especially in Lesotho's highlands, poor and hungry voters can be easily bought with food and warm clothes instead of programmatic responsiveness (interviews conducted with politicians and political experts in Lesotho).
As discussed in the previous section, neo-liberal policy pressures from international organizations and donors on Lesotho's government explain how the initially rather 'leftist' LCD struggles to give itself a consistent self-image regarding policy sub-dimensions like privatization. The LCD government privatized Lesotho's national airline and the flour mill with the result that there is currently no airline anymore in Lesotho and the country is importing more maize from South Africa than before. Accordingly, unemployment and food prices increased (interviews with political experts and politicians in Lesotho, 2010) . Accordingly, the LCD does not respond to its support base anymore regarding these issues. However, the opposition parties so far fail to profit more from the newly free policy space as they are not enough consistent internally.
That the margin of programmatic responsiveness is not as large as expected between Botswana may partly explained by the fact that Botswana is ethnically not as homogenous as Lesotho. The analysis showed that Batswana's (denonym, the people of Botswana) party preferences are ethnically structured as minority tribes are more likely to vote for the BCP and the 'major' tribes are to a stronger degree linked to the BDP and BNF. Such ethnic ties my overshadow and cross-cut otherwise salient policy divides in the electorate and among the elite. Accordingly, they weaken programmatic responsiveness in non-ethnic policy issues. Lesotho, as one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in Africa does not face this problem. Instead, I analyzed the impact of clan-structures in Lesotho. 9 Lesotho's clans are equally distributed among the electorate of the three parties.
Conclusion
The paper showed that dominant party systems in African electoral democracies are able to promote democratic consolidation by providing some amount of programmatic responsiveness; one of the most important indicators of democratic quality. However, they need to have a rather stable opposition and favorable conditions like some socioeconomic development, which goes hand in hand with less externally caused policy distortion by international organizations and donors. Ideological continuation since the initial formation of the party system is a favorable, although rather exceptional condition in Africa as well. Lesotho's dominant party system shows that an unstable opposition may be partly compensated by a more proportionate electoral system and an ethnically homogenous society, whereof the latter is a rather exceptional condition in Africa as well.
In the future, we need party elite data for further African electoral democracies to systematize comparison and substantiate my conclusions. 
